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Increasingly, non-governmental organization (NGO) and industry eco-labels compete. Environmental beneﬁts may increase or decrease with entry by an industry label, depending on
the shape of consumers’ willingness to pay and the shape of the distribution of forest compliance costs. Using geospatial data from forests in Cameroon and Gabon to proxy for compliance
costs, I test whether lower compliance cost forests are more likely to participate in stricter
labels. Next, I use a semi-nonparametric estimator to estimate parameters for willingness to
pay and the distribution of forest compliance costs to calculate beneﬁts with and without
label competition. I ﬁnd that, in this context, eco-label competition decreases environmental beneﬁts by 17%. The industry label lures away a suﬃcient number of forests that would
have chosen an NGO standard in autarky, overwhelming gains from broader participation and
a stricter NGO standard. The distribution of forest compliance cost is skewed toward high
cost forests. Willingness to pay is bowed: initial increases in protection have a high marginal
willingness-to-pay but additional increases are less valuable. Industry certiﬁed wood prices
are predicted to be 14–28% higher than uncertiﬁed wood. NGO certiﬁed wood prices are predicted to be 9–17% higher than industry certiﬁed wood.

1. Introduction
Like tuna or diamonds, special hardwoods come from areas with poor local monitoring. In these areas, timber ﬁrms claim
to avoid destroying the forest but, absent monitoring, may fail to follow through. As an alternative, a consumer could pay a
little more and buy wood - or diamonds, or tuna – displayed with an eco-label, which indicates an auditor found it to satisfy
a minimum standard. Eco-labels address monitoring failures and may lead to better environmental protection (Hamilton and
Zilberman, 2006). They also increase industry proﬁts.
About a quarter of over 400 eco-labels are managed by industry.1 Entry into eco-label markets is unregulated – there is no
global minimum standard – and entry by industry has increased more rapidly than by other groups (Gruere, 2015). The effect of
competition between industry and environmentalist eco-labels on environmental protection is theoretically ambiguous (Fischer
and Lyon, 2014; Fischer and Lyon, 2019; Li and van’t Veld, 2015). Industry standards tend to be weaker, drawing ﬁrms away from
the stricter environmentalist standard. Yet, a weaker standard extends some environmental protection to higher-cost ﬁrms.
Theoretically, label competition may help or hurt environmental protection.
In practice, which is it - does competition help or hurt? Calls to harmonize standards make this question urgent, yet we lack
empirical evidence. In this paper, I use the theoretical framework developed by Fischer and Lyon (2014) and variation in forest
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Industry deﬁned as producer groups or for-proﬁt ﬁrms. Reference: ecolabelling.org, accessed August 7, 2017.

compliance costs to address this question in the context of forestry in the Congo Basin. The Congo Basin forest is second in size
to the Amazon and it is globally important in regulating climate and housing biodiversity. Locally, it provides food, shelter, ﬁber,
and other products to sixty million forest users and indirectly supports forty million people in nearby urban areas (Nasi et al.,
2011).
A forest’s compliance costs depend on the eco-label’s monitoring criteria. For tropical forestry, compliance costs include:
opportunity costs from leaving trees behind; infrastructure costs from detailed road-planning to avoid hillsides and streams;
administrative costs from tracking wood from stump to port; conservation costs from setting aside critical habitat; and development costs from offering services to local communities. Global and regional spatial data proxy for compliance costs. I estimate
an ordered probit and a semi-nonparametric estimator to ﬁnd the cutoff forest types for each label, trace out the compliance cost
distribution, and tests predictions from the theoretical model by showing that lower cost forests are more likely to participate
in stricter labels. Using the cutoffs and the distribution of compliance costs, I infer the shape of consumers’ willingness to pay
for environmental protection and assess whether competition helps or hurts environmental beneﬁts.
Whether competition helps or hurts depends on how compliance costs vary across ﬁrms. Firms with lower costs participate
in stricter labels. Stricter labels earn higher prices but have fewer participants. Absent competition, the environmentalist faces
a trade off: a strict standard with few participants, each protecting more, or a weak standard with more participants, each
protecting less. Competition with industry may lead to a race to the bottom or it may allow each label to focus on a different
margin - the environmentalist strict protection and industry broad participation - so that, together, they increase protection
more than the environmentalist alone. However, even if labels differentiate with competition, beneﬁts may decrease. The change
in beneﬁts depends on how environmental beneﬁts lost from ﬁrms switching to the industry label compares to increases in
beneﬁts more ﬁrms participating and a stricter NGO standard.
I ﬁnd that eco-label competition likely decreases protection for Congo Basin forests. For Congo Basin timber, observable
proxies and two label thresholds offer evidence that forests select into labels based on compliance cost. The analysis is sensitive
to assumptions about the unobserved distribution of forest types, thus using a semi-nonparametric estimator is key. Though the
labels differentiate with competition, I ﬁnd the distribution of forest types is skewed toward high cost forests. This distributional
shape limits the increase in participation in the industry label and exaggerates the loss of protection from inframarginal forests
that would have chosen the NGO label in autarky but switch instead to the industry label with competition. Based on the shape
of the distribution and price premium, NGO certiﬁed timber is expected to earn 9–17% more than industry certiﬁed timber and
industry certiﬁed timber is expected to earn 14–28% more than uncertiﬁed timber.
This paper makes four contributions to the literature. First, though eco-labels have been richly treated in the theoretical literature, we have few empirical tests of our theoretical models’ predictions (Bonroy and Constantatos, 2015). This paper addresses
this gap by testing predictions from the Fischer and Lyon (2014) model. I ﬁnd strong evidence that forests with low compliance
costs choose to participate in stricter standards.2 We might expect this type of selection to occur in voluntary policies more generally. Selection on costs complicates empirical evaluation of policy effectiveness and limits the scope of eco-labels as a policy
tool for increasing environmental beneﬁts.
The second contribution is to rigorously assess, for the ﬁrst time, whether eco-label competition helps or hurts environmental
beneﬁts. Though we have some evidence that weaker labels change harvesting practices (Cerutti et al., 2011; Heilmayr and Lambin, 2016), these studies cannot answer whether beneﬁts with an industry label increase relative to an NGO label in autarky. The
empirical methodology developed in this paper can be replicated in different contexts. Does label competition always decrease
beneﬁts in forestry settings? What about areas with weak governance? More work is needed to document empirical patterns
of eco-label compettion and environmental beneﬁts and help policymakers better understand when to restrict label entry by
industry.
The third contribution of this paper is to estimate the shape of consumers’ willingness to pay for environmental beneﬁts from
responsible forestry. I ﬁnd that the price premium is bowed: initial increases in protection have a high marginal willingnessto-pay but each additional unit of protection is less valuable. Though estimates of the price premium for NGO certiﬁed timber
relative to uncertiﬁed timber exist (Kollert and Lagan, 2007; Nebel et al., 2005), we lack estimates of the price premium for
industry certiﬁed timber and how it relates to NGO certiﬁed timber. The price for NGO certiﬁed timber is likely about 9–17%
higher than industry certiﬁed timber.
The ﬁnal contribution of this paper is to showcase a ﬂexible semi-nonparametric estimator developed by Gallant and Douglas
(1987) and made accessible by Stewart (2004) to estimate willingness-to-pay (WTP) for environmental protection. Relaxing
distributional assumptions when estimating willingness to pay has long been an interest for environmental economists (Cooper,
2002; Crooker and Herriges, 2004; Chen and Randall, 1997; Stewart, 2004) and continues to be of interest today (Bergtold and
Ramsey, 2015). The semi-nonparametric estimator used here can be used for the travel cost method (Huang et al., 2008) and
other settings with ordinal data.
2. Forestry eco-labels in Central Africa
Governments claim rights to forested areas in Central Africa (Agrawal et al., 2008). They auction 15–30 year rights to extract
timber to private, proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms via a “concession” system. Fig. 1 shows forest management in Cameroon and Gabon.
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This prediction emerges from the Li and van’t Veld (2015) model as well.

Fig. 1. Forest management units in Cameroon and Gabon.

Table 1
Forest certiﬁcation by type and country.

Country

Uncertiﬁed

Cameroon
Gabon
Total

79
35
114

Participation Status
Industry
NGO
22
8
30

12
5
17

Total
113
48
161

Hatches mark protected areas, industry certiﬁed forests are dark grey, NGO certiﬁed forests are light grey, uncertiﬁed forests
are the lightest color. About 30% of forests certify; Table 1 breaks down participation by country. Firms manage almost half of
the total forested area. With two exceptions, all ﬁrms are privately owned.3 In the late nineties, each country reformed forest
management as part of structural adjustment. More than half of all industrial forests were created after 2002 and another wave
of forest auctions took place around 2005.
Uncertiﬁed ﬁrms in Cameroon and Gabon fail to incorporate careful harvesting, conservation, and development practices
into their management. In Cameroon, as of 2009, most forests had a management plan recognized the Ministry of Forestry.
However, an analysis of 20 forest management plans in Cameroon found that most plans were of poor quality (Vandenhaute
and Doucet, 2006). Firms avoid harvesting constraints by exploiting a rule that 75% of the inventoried timber volume must be
managed by selecting species they do not intend to harvest as “managed” and leaving the species with high commercial value
as unmanaged (Cerutti et al., 2011).
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The two exceptions in Cameroon, Alpi and Rougier, have family as the majority shareholders.

Table 2
Summary statistics by cost type.

Cost Type

FSC indicator

Variable

mean

sd

min

max

N

Opportunity

5.6, 6.3

Careful Harvesting

5.3, 5.5, 6.5

Administrative

6.5, 8.3

Development
Conservation

2.2, 3.2, 4.1, 6.2
6.2, 9.3

Annual rainfall, cm (log)
Gorilla
Distance to Port, km (log)
Std Dev Slope (degree)
River Area (pct)
Size, ha (log)
Awarded after 2004
Population Density
Distance to PA, km (log)

5.17
0.76
5.18
0.81
6.10
11.22
0.48
0.46
2.73

0.16
0.43
0.47
0.68
1.88
0.76
0.50
0.46
0.71

4.94
0
3.41
0.19
1.35
9.24
0
0.05
1.04

5.64
1
5.90
4.69
12.76
13.33
1
2.94
4.24

161
161
161
161
161
161
161
161
161

Notes: Gorilla is a dummy variable equal to one if the forest has any suitable gorilla habitat within its boundaries. PA refers to distance to
protected area.

In response, by 2009 two types of eco-labels competed in Cameroon and Gabon: a label managed by an NGO, Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), and two labels managed by industry. Each label emerged in Central Africa about the same time, in 2004.
Certiﬁcation applies to a forest management unit. The NGO label, Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), is considered among the
most credible of eco-labels. The label’s global standard, described in a series of “Principles,” was originally deﬁned in 1999. Local
standards for Cameroon and Gabon emerged later.4 The process of becoming FSC certiﬁed typically takes about three years. FSC
certiﬁcation in Central Africa is veriﬁed by one of three auditing ﬁrms, SGS, Bureau Veritas, or Rainforest Alliance.
Two of these auditing ﬁrms created their own labels verifying timber origin and legality. SGS’s Timber Legality, Traceability,
and Veriﬁcation (TLTV) and Bureau Veritas’ Wood Origin and Legality (OLB) are not identical but they are very similar and appear
to act as perfect substitutes locally.5 In the analysis, I treat them as one industry label. The industry standards emphasize documentation of compliance with legal requirements and tracing timber from stump to customer. Industry protections are nested
within FSC’s standard and ﬁrms use them as a stepping stone to FSC certiﬁcation. All ﬁrms participating in FSC also participated
in an industry standard, likely because FSC certiﬁcation takes several years and the ﬁrst step, to gather documentation and verify origin, is often done by the same auditing ﬁrm that manages the industry label.6 Some ﬁrms stop at industry certiﬁcation.
Firms may keep their industry certiﬁcation alongside their FSC certiﬁcation because it is nearly costless to do so and because a
combination of similar labels may appeal to consumers (Sirieix et al., 2011).
Compliance with the FSC standard is costly. An estimate from a forest in the Republic of Congo included an initial cost of
1500 to 2000 FCFA/ha (about $3/ha), and a recurring annual cost ranging from 355 to 1000 FCFA/ha (World Bank, 2007).7 Compliance costs can be grouped into ﬁve types: opportunity; careful harvesting; administrative; development; and conservation.
Key monitoring criteria linked to compliance costs are listed in Appendix Table A1. Geospatial data used to proxy for each type
of compliance cost are listed in Table 2 and described in detail in the Data Appendix.
Opportunity costs come from leaving trees behind to allow the species to regenerate. The NGO standard increases the minimum harvesting diameter for species with poor demographics beyond the legal requirement.8 Criteria 6.5 of SGS’s Timber
Legality, Traceability, and Veriﬁcation (TLTV) standard for Gabon requires ﬁrms to prove they have not exceeded the annual
harvesting limit (SGS, 2008). In this way, the industry standard enforces legally required increases in the minimum harvesting
diameters for species with poor demographics and generates an opportunity cost in the context of poor monitoring. Cerutti et
al. (2011) found that industry certiﬁcation reduced harvesting by an average 11% and FSC certiﬁcation reduced harvesting by an
average 18%. Forests with larger trees will, on average, have lower opportunity costs from managing species’ demographics.
Firms may incur additional costs from careful harvesting to must avoid streams, rivers, and sloped areas and document their
harvesting plan. FSC Indicator 6.5.1 states that “forest management and its infrastructure shall avoid sensitive areas (valleys,
river banks, steep slopes).” Similarly, FSC Indicator 6.5.9 affects road-building, specifying that “the transport network within
the [forest management unit] shall be properly constructed and maintained so as to avoid erosion and disturbance to natural
drainage patterns.” Implementing a careful harvesting plan to avoid streams, rivers and sloped areas is costly. Trees must be
marked prior to felling in a well-documented, geo-referenced inventory and indicated on a harvesting map.9 Firms must contract
with consulting ﬁrms, train or hire personnel, create management systems for geospatial software and a database for tracking
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Since 2009, FSC has initiated a consultative process to deﬁne sub-regional standards for the Congo Basin.
No ﬁrm certiﬁes both TLTV and OLB.
6
For example, CEB, a ﬁrm in Gabon, received industry certiﬁcation from OLB in 2007 and FSC certiﬁcation in 2009.
7
Estimates based on the FSC-certiﬁed Kabo concession in Northern Republic of Congo.
8
Firms rotate harvesting across the forest concession, dividing it into annual blocks. This precludes ﬁrms from temporarily shifting their production while
certiﬁed to areas with more large trees. The use of a minimum harvesting diameter to control logging is a practice common to all tropical forests. It emerged after
World War II to control logging in the Philippines and Indonesia (Appanah and Turnbull, 1998). Critics have pointed out that it does not guarantee sustainable
management in tropical forests (Sist et al., 2003). Its main beneﬁt is that it is easy to monitor. There are other criteria used by FSC, including some of those
recommended by (Sist et al., 2003), such as not felling species with very low densities. However, responding to these criteria is much less costly than the
minimum diameter requirement.
9
Another example of how the industry standard is nested within the NGO standard relates to careful harvesting. Criteria 6.4 of SGS’s Timber Legality, Traceability, and Veriﬁcation (TLTV) standard for Gabon requires ﬁrms to mark and register stumps, logs, and trees when prospecting, extracting, and transporting
(SGS, 2008). This forces ﬁrms to document and track harvesting as well as respect legal limitations, such as forest boundaries.
5

timber through the supply chain such as Helveta Ltd’s CI World. Though costly, these systems enable greater harvesting precision
and may be cost effective for ﬁrms practicing selective logging, such as those with high transport costs. Fixed costs can be spread
out for larger forests.
FSC requires ﬁrms to respect local communities’ use rights, offer employment and training to local communities, and monitor
inappropriate ﬁshing and hunting. In Congo Basin forests, feeder roads connecting communities to a road network are often
suﬃciently degraded as to become impassable. Accessing communities to provide services and monitor hunting and ﬁshing
requires road construction, which is costly. Development costs are also increasing in the total population living within the forest
boundaries. Finally, ﬁrms incur conservation costs from protecting rare, threatened and endangered species and ensuring the
maintenance of high conservation value areas. Forests with higher conservation value due to unique habitat will face higher
costs related to conservation.
3. Theoretical model
I use the theoretical framework of Fischer and Lyon (2014) to compare environmental beneﬁts from an NGO label in autarky
and an NGO label that competes with an industry label. I ﬁrst introduce the model framework, which justiﬁes the empirical
framework. I then ﬁnd the standard for the industry label with competition, then the standard for the NGO label with competition. I close by exploring how eco-label competition changes environmental beneﬁts.

3.1. Model framework
Consider ﬁrms that supply timber to a global market. Each ﬁrm manages one forest and sells a unit of timber. Forests are
of identical size but vary in their abundance, � . Forests abundant in large trees have a lower opportunity cost of leaving trees
behind for future harvest than less abundant forests, � < � . Firms choose the fraction of trees left behind, s, which results in an
opportunity cost s� . The distribution of forests, f(� ), is common knowledge; individual forest type is private.
A representative consumer is willing to pay a price premium for timber from a ﬁrm that leaves trees behind. The price
premium increases with the share of trees left behind, p′ (s) > 0, and is concave, p″(s) < 0. I assume the price premium has a
functional form,10 where i is a label managed by either an NGO, N, or industry, I,
p(si ) = ln(1 + Jsi ) + A

(1)

To ensure all ﬁrms would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to participate, I assume that p′ (0) = J > � . Eco-labels verify ﬁrm claims and eliminate
fraud. An eco-label chooses a minimum share of trees to leave behind as its standard and veriﬁes compliance. Firms choose
no management, s = 0, or comply with an eco-label. Absent management, ﬁrms earn � (�, 0) = p(0) − c for their timber.
Harvesting costs are identical across ﬁrms.
Firm payoff from label i is

� (�, si ) = p(si ) − si � + � (�, 0)

(2)

where � (�, 0) is the proﬁt earned when unconstrained. A ﬁrm chooses standard si if p(si ) − � si + � (�, 0) > � (�, 0). This gives
a cutoff forest type for each label i, where the ﬁrm participates in label i if its costs are below label i’s cutoff type � i

� < �i ≡

p(si )
si

(3)

Lemma 1 describes how forests sort into labels, which I test empirically.
′

Lemma 1. For each standard i, the forest cutoff type � i is weakly decreasing in the standard, � i

( i)
s

< 0.

Proof. See Fischer and Lyon (2014: 696). An implication of Lemma 1 is that if the NGO standard is stricter than the industry
standard, forests with the lowest costs will choose the NGO standard. Let the subscript C denote eco-label competition. Forest
types between the NGO and industry cutoff type �CN < � ≤ �CI will choose the industry label, and those above the industry cutoff
type � > �CI will opt out of either label.11

So far, this section presented relationships between a standard and its cutoff type. Policymakers are most concerned about
when industry enters an eco-label market where an NGO eco-label existed in autarky. Given that NGO and industry set standards strategically, eco-label competition may increase or decrease environmental beneﬁts as compared to an NGO standard in
autarky. I model eco-labels that are vertically differentiated.12 Next, I consider the industry standard with competition.

This is similar to the shape used in Fischer and Lyon (2014), p(si ) = Hln(1 + Jsi ). Empirically, I cannot separately identify H and J.
This lemma and its implications for forest type motivates the empirical framework, an ordered probit.
12
An alternative would be horizontal differentiation, when labels that monitor different environmental practices. See Heyes and Martin (2016) for a model of
eco-label competition with horizontal differentiation.
10
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3.2. Industry standard with competition
The industry group standard, sIC , maximizes industry proﬁts. The industry group’s objective function in the case where the

industry standard is weaker than the NGO standard, sIC < sCN , is
�CN

Π(sIC , sNC ) =

∫�

(p(sNC ) − � sCN )f (� )d� +

�CI

∫� N

(p(sIC ) − � sIC )f (� )d�

(4)

C

The left term reﬂects proﬁts for ﬁrms participating in the stricter NGO standard. The right term reﬂects proﬁts for ﬁrms participating in the weaker industry standard. The ﬁrst order condition is

∫

p′ (�CI ) = �CI −

�CI
�CN

F (� )d�
(5)

F (�CI )

Deﬁne

� I ≡ �CI −

∫

�CI

�CN

F (� )d�
(6)

F (�CI )

so that p′ (�CI ) = � I . Using the price deﬁnition (1) gives an expression relating p(sIC ) to the cutoff type,13
ln(

J

�I

) = p(sCI )

(7)

Use this in the industry cutoff type expression (3),
sIC =

ln(J ∕� I )

(8)

�CI

to get the standard as a function of cutoff type, price premium parameter, and the distribution of forest types, each of which will
be estimated empirically.
3.3. NGO standard with competition
The NGO standard maximizes environmental beneﬁts. The NGO objective function with competition, given that the NGO
standard is stronger than the industry standard, sN
> sIC , is
C
B(sN
; sI ) =
C C

�CN

∫�

sN
f (� )d� +
C

�CI

∫� N

sIC f (� )d�

(9)

C

The NGO’s ﬁrst order condition is
p′ (�CN ) = �CN −

F (�CI )
f (�CI )

(10)

Deﬁne

�CN ≡ �CN − F (�CI )∕f (�CI )

(11)

so that p′ (�CN ) = �CN . Use this to ﬁnd an expression for sN
C
sN
=
C

1

�CN

− 1∕J

(12)

Rearrange the expression to get p(sCN ) = ln(J ∕�CN ). Use the NGO cutoff type to ﬁnd an expression that implicitly deﬁnes J in terms

of � N , � I and the cutoff types,

�CN =

13

p(sN
) − p(sIC )
C
sCN − sCI

(13)

Note that there are three prices in the market: the price for uncertiﬁed wood, p(0), the price for industry certiﬁed wood, p(sIC ), and the price for NGO certiﬁed

wood, p(sNC ). The following expression relates the industry certiﬁed price to the industry cutoff type. In autarky, ﬁrms managing forests with a type below the

industry cutoff but above the NGO cutoff will choose the industry label. They will earn p(sIC ) = ln(J∕� I ) even though their type is � < � I . I exploit the fact that
p(sCi ) does not depend on a forest’s type, only on the cutoff type, in the empirical framework.

�CN =

ln(J ∕� N ) − ln(J ∕� I )
1∕� N − 1∕J −

ln(J∕� I )

(14)

�CI

the components of which will be estimated empirically.
3.4. How competition changes environmental beneﬁts
The goal of this paper is to assess whether label competition helps or hurts environmental beneﬁts in a particular context,
timber production in Central Africa. To do this, I must ﬁrst validate the model by testing Lemma 1. Then, I must compare empirical estimates of environmental beneﬁts from an NGO standard in autarky to NGO and industry standards with competition. This
section describes the theoretical model’s description of the change in environmental beneﬁts from label competition.
to maximize environmental beneﬁts, B(sN
) = sNA F (�AN ). Deﬁne the change in
In autarky, the NGO chooses its standard sN
A
A
beneﬁts from competition as
B(sN
, sI ) − B(sAN , 0) = sCI F (�CI ) + (sNC − sIC )F (�CN ) − sAN F (�AN )
C C

(15)

From Fischer and Lyon’s (2014) Proposition 4, the NGO standard may tighten or loosen in response to competition. If the
NGO standard loosens, environmental beneﬁts are lower with competition. If the NGO standard tightens, the competing labels
differentiate: the industry standard is looser than the NGO in autarky and the competitive NGO standard is stricter than the
autarky NGO standard. In this case, environmental beneﬁts may increase.14 But even if the labels differentiate, label competition
may decrease environmental beneﬁts.15
Whether label competition decreases environmental beneﬁts depends on the shape of the distribution of forest compliance
costs, � , relative to the price premium. The shape of these two primitives varies by context and is an empirical question. From
simulations, Fischer and Lyon (2014) conclude that competition increases environmental beneﬁts for suﬃciently “wide” distributions or those “skewed toward low-cost forests,” relative to the shape of the price premium.16 Using their framework, I
ﬁnd the parameter value for the price premium, J, and relate it to the distribution of forest types in order to assess whether
competition increased or decreased environmental beneﬁts from forest conservation in the Congo Basin.
4. Data
Assessing eco-label competition requires data on forest management and proxies for unobserved forest compliance cost
type. The list of certiﬁed forests came from World Resources Institute’s Global Forest Watch (GFW) Atlases for each country
(Cameroon and Gabon) and FSC, OLB, and SGS’s online databases. Certiﬁcation status is coded as the highest certiﬁcation level
a forest attains during the study period.17 Table 1 shows certiﬁcation status by country for all forests allocated to ﬁrms. The
fraction of forests certiﬁed is about 30% within a country and overall.
For the Congo Basin, the best predictor of large tree abundance - high aboveground biomass and low stem density - was
annual rainfall (Lewis et al., 2013). Rainfall is measured as the median value for annual rainfall across all pixels in the forest using
data from WorldClim database, Version 4 (release 3); the average across forests is 176 cm. I use the natural log of this value in
the regressions. Lewis et al. (2013) cite large mammal presence as a possible reason for the abundance of large trees - elephants
and gorillas may eat saplings, decreasing competition for mature trees. The Institute of Applied Ecology’s area of occupancy
describes the possible range for gorillas using three classiﬁcations (Boitani, 1998): suitable, highly suitable, and unsuitable. I
create a dummy variable equal to one if the forest includes any highly suitable Gorilla gorilla habitat within its boundaries. Three
quarters of forests have some highly suitable habitat.
High transportation costs encourage ﬁrms to leave smaller trees behind, decreasing the opportunity cost of compliance.
Using shapeﬁles from GFW, I construct a variable equal to the euclidean distance from the centroid of the forest to the nearest
seaport to capture variation in transport costs; the average distance is 177 km. Varied terrain reduces the opportunity cost of
leaving trees behind because ﬁrms may already use sophisticated selective logging techniques. Variation in terrain is measured
by the standard deviation of the slope of the forest concession, in degrees. Elevation data derived from 90m NASA’s Shuttle
Radar Topography Mission (SRTM) was used to calculate the slope for each square kilometer. The slope variable is the standard
deviation of the slope of all 1 km squares within the forest; the average is 0.81.18 The average share of the total area of the forest
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I will empirically test for label differentiation by testing whether the industry and NGO cutoff points are statistically different from one another.
From Fischer and Lyon’s (2014) Proposition 5, the NGO’s best response function is piece-wise monotonically increasing in the industry label if the distribution
of forest costs is unimodal and the industry cutoff type is below the mode. However, there is a discontinuity in the NGO’s best response function, meaning it
could jump down below the autarky level before the mode. This renders a unimodal distribution and an industry cutoff below the mode insuﬃcient conditions
for an increase in environmental beneﬁts.
16
For the uniform distribution, their Proposition 7 ﬁnds that competition fails to change environmental beneﬁts.
17
For example, a forest that receives ﬁrst industry certiﬁcation and then FSC certiﬁcation is coded as FSC certiﬁed.
18
As a robustness check, I estimated the model using the average slope magnitude and a combination of the average and standard deviation of the slope. The
coeﬃcient for the average slope has the same sign and a similar magnitude, though the AIC is a bit lower for both speciﬁcations.
15

area permanently inundated with rivers was 6.1%.19
To proxy for development costs, I use the population density of the forest. The average population density is 0.35 people
per hectare. Population data come from the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) of the Earth
Institute at Columbia University’s Gridded Population of the World, version 3 (GPWv3). Population density was calculated by
summing population across the forest and then dividing total population by forest size, in hectares.
To proxy for additional conservation costs from unique habitat, I use the distance to the nearest protected area. Protected
area boundaries come from World Resources Institute’s Global Forest Watch Atlases for each country. I use the average of the
shortest distance to a protected area for each cell within the forest management unit. For the empirical analysis, I use the natural
log of this average. Details on geographical data preparation are included in the Data Appendix.
5. Empirical framework
This section presents a latent variable model that embodies the theoretical framework. The presentation of the econometric
model follows Stewart (2004). Let y∗i for i = 1, … , N be a latent variable that reﬂects unobserved type for forest i, which was
described as � in the theoretical model and reﬂects compliance costs. The vector xi gathers M observed proxies for these costs,
measured imperfectly. Suppose the relationship between unobserved type and proxies is linear:
y∗i = x′i � + �i

(16)

where � is a M × 1 vector of unknown parameters and �i is a random-error term independently distributed with cumulative
distribution function F with known variance.
If we observed forest type y∗i directly, we could estimate the density and cutoff types directly directly. However, instead of
forest type we observe eco-label certiﬁcation yi . Eco-label participation is an ordinal variable yi that relates to unobserved forest
type y∗ by:
yi = 1[NGOstandard]

if �0 < y∗i < �1

yi = 2[Industrystandard]

if �1 ≤ y∗i < �2

yi = 3[None]

if �2 < y∗i < �3

where the estimated threshold parameters [� 1 , � 2 ] are the label cutoff types. The cutoff types partition the range of forest type
y∗i into mutually exclusive intervals. The probability of a particular outcome, NGO certiﬁed, industry certiﬁed, or uncertiﬁed, is

[

]

given by Pr yi = j|x for j = 1, 2, 3. For example, the probability of industry certiﬁcation is
Pr[yi = 2] = Pr[�1 ≤ y∗i < �2 ]

= Pr[�1 − x′i � ≤ yi∗ < �2 − xi′ � ]
= F (�1 − x′i ) − F (�2 − x′i )
The probabilities for NGO and no certiﬁcation are deﬁned as Pr[yi = 1] = (� 1 − x′i ) and Pr[yi = 3] = 1 − (� 2 − x′i ). Assume
� 0 = − and � 3 = + . This gives a more compact form for the probabilities,
Pr[y = j] = F (�j − x′i � ) − F (�j−1 − x′i � )

(17)

For identiﬁcation, xi must not include a constant term, pinning the intercept at zero.
In this model, a linear function of x is a known transformation of the cumulative probabilities.
F −1 Pr[yi ≤ j] = �j − x′i �
Unlike in the multinomial case, the coeﬃcients are the same for each category; only the intercepts differ across categories.
We can use maximum likelihood to estimate the threshold parameters. Deﬁne yij = 1 if yij = j else yij = 0. The loglikelihood function uses equation (17) and is maximized with respect to (�, � 1 , � 2 ). It is deﬁned as
n

3

[

yij F (�j − x′i � ) − F (�j−1 − x′i � )

LogL =

]
(18)

i=1 j=1

Given M = 10 covariates and J − 1 = 2 categories, there are 12 parameters. The sign of the index coeﬃcients � reﬂects the
direction of the effect of xi on the probabilities of the two extremes, Pr[y = 0|x] and Pr[y = 2|x]. Some proxies are expected to

19
The share of the area covered by waterways is calculated as the total area within the FMU covered by rivers, streams, or lakes divided by the total area of
the FMU.

covary positively with forest type while others covary negatively.
The most common distributions used for ordered responses are the standard normal and logistic distributions. The standard
normal distribution, Φ, gives the ordered probit model introduced by Aitchison and Silvey (1957). If we normalize the 2 = 1
to scale the model and impose an intercept of zero, the probabilities are
Pr[yi = j] = Φ(�j − x′i � ) − Φ(�j−1 − x′i � )
This expression would replace the terms in brackets in the log-likelihood equation (18), swapping in the normal distribution Φ
for the distribution F.
The ordered probit model has four identifying assumptions: a linear index function, normality, homoskedasticity, and an
error variance of one. Normality enables estimation by maximum likelihood. Homoskedasticity separates a covariate’s location
and scale effects on the latent dependent variable. Normalizing the variance of the error term to 2 = 1 ﬁxes the scale of the
dependent variable.
5.1. Alternative speciﬁcation: semi-nonparametric estimation
Our goal is to estimate the distribution of unobserved forest type, G(ŷi ), as well as test Lemma 1 through the vector of
coeﬃcients, � . Assumptions on the distribution F will shape the distribution of predicted forest types. As an alternative to the
ordered probit, I will use a semi-nonparametric (SNP) series estimator for an unknown density proposed by Gallant and Douglas
(1987). Stewart (2005) found that the SNP estimator performed better, in terms of root mean square error, than alternative
estimators proposed by Lewbel (2000) and Ruud (1984).
Gallant and Douglas (1987) deﬁne the density as a Hermite series and apply standard ﬁnite dimensional maximum likelihood
methods. As long as the length of the series increases with sample size, the model parameters and unknown density will be
estimated consistently. To ensure that the density integrates to one and is non-negative, the Hermite series is in the form of the
product of a squared polynomial and a normal density function, �(�)

(

fK (�) =
where

1

�k �

�

�(�)

k

k=0

(

�=
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�(�)d�
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To normalize, restrict � 0 = 1, where � = (� 0 , � 1 , … , � K ). Together, this deﬁnes the family of semi-nonparametric distributions
as
u

FK (u) =
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∫−

(∑
(∑

K
k=0

�k �k

K
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�k �k

)2
)2
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(19)

�(�)d�

for increasing values of K.
Gallant and Douglas (1987) use a recursion of truncated moments of a standard normal distribution to ﬁnd the cumulative
probabilities of expression (19) needed for the psuedo-likelihood function.20 After this recursion, the cumulative probabilities
can be written as
FK (u) = Φ(u) −

1[

�

]
ΓK (u) �(u)

(20)

where the term in brackets, ΓK (u), is a polynomial of u of order (2K − 1). As seen in expression (20), the probabilities lead with
a standard normal cumulative distribution function and are then differenced by the product of the standard normal density
and a polynomial in u. Maximizing the log-likelihood expression (18) by replacing the unknown distribution F with FK (u) of
expression (20) gives the SNP estimator.
For consistency of the Gallant and Douglas (1987) SNP estimator, the unknown density must be suﬃciently smooth and with
an upper bound on the tails. The estimator can accommodate density skewness and kurtosis and only fails when the density
is “violently oscillatory” (Gallant and Douglas, 1987). Stewart (2004) provides a routine in stata to estimate the Gallant and
Douglas (1987) SNP. He follows Melenberg and AHO Van Soest (1996), choosing to normalize the model by using the estimate
from an ordered probit for the ﬁrst cutpoint.21
When using the SNP, inference depends on the choice of K. For K < 3, the model collapses to the ordered probit case. Thus
K = 3 is the lowest possible value for the SNP. In a sense, the model is parametric for a given K and the choice of K can be
justiﬁed using likelihood-ratio tests or the Akaike information criterion.

20
21

See Stewart (2004) for a very readable derivation of the cumulative probabilities.
This is why the ﬁrst cutpoint says “Fixed” in the results table.

5.2. Model ﬁt and use of estimates
To test the identifying assumption that there is a linear relationship between x and the cumulative probabilities, I will compare the baseline speciﬁcation, an ordered probit, to a multinomial probit using likelihood ratio tests and the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC). I will also use likelihood ratio tests and the AIC to compare the baseline speciﬁcation to the alternative speciﬁcation, the SNP estimator, as well as different polynomials K for the SNP estimator. Though I cannot compare the � from the
baseline and alternative speciﬁcation directly, I will compare their ratios, which are proportional to the ratio of the marginal
effects.
Once I have selected my preferred speciﬁcation, I will test for label differentiation using a Wald test comparing the industry
and NGO cutpoints. I will also test Lemma 1’s prediction that ﬁrms managing lower cost forests choose stricter standards by
evaluating coeﬃcient direction.
Once satisﬁed with model ﬁt, I will predict forest type using model estimates. The cut points, as well as the distribution and
density of predicted types, will identify the NGO and industry standards with competition, the NGO standard in autarky, the
shape parameter for the price premium and the change in environmental beneﬁts from competition.
6. Results
This section tests predictions from the theoretical model for timber ﬁrms in the Congo Basin and assesses whether eco-label
competition increases or decreases environmental beneﬁts. The unobserved latent variable corresponds to forest type. I begin
by comparing an ordered probit with a semi-nonparametric estimator to select our main speciﬁcation, using compliance cost
proxies to ﬂesh out the shape of the latent variable’s distribution. Coeﬃcients indicate if forests sort into labels based on their
compliance cost, allowing us to test Lemma 1. Cut values correspond to theoretical cutoff types, allowing us to test whether
competing labels differentiate. I use the estimated shape of forest compliance costs to ﬁnd the change in environmental beneﬁts
from competition. Finally, I explore the shape of the price premium and its implications for industry and NGO certiﬁed timber
prices.

6.1. Modeling the distribution of forest types
The interaction between the unobserved price premium and the unobserved distribution of forest types determines whether
eco-label competition increases or decreases environmental beneﬁts. This section compares model ﬁt for two approaches to
estimating the distribution of forest compliance cost: assuming the unobserved error term has a standard normal distribution
via the ordered probit versus ﬂexibly estimating the density as a function of a normal density and a squared polynomial term
via the SNP.22 I compare model ﬁt using likelihood ratio tests and the AIC.
Table 3 reports index coeﬃcients, cut values, log-likelihoods and AIC for an ordered probit in the ﬁrst column and seminonparametric estimator in the second column. In each case, the outcome is an ordinal variable equal to 1 if the forest participates in the NGO standard, 2 if it participates in the industry standard, and 3 if it never participates.23 The ordered probit is
nested within the semi-nonparametric estimator, having a polynomial level K = 2.
Although we cannot directly compare the coeﬃcient estimates across the two models, we can compare ratios of coeﬃcients.
Comparing the ratios, I ﬁnd very small differences for most coeﬃcients. The exceptions are for ratios that relate to forest size,
which is noisy, as well as the ratio of port distance to river area and slope to river area.24 If we compare the precision of each
coeﬃcient estimate across the two models we ﬁnd similar levels of precision, with the exception of annual rainfall, which is
much more precisely estimated with the SNP.
Moving to the bottom of Table 3, we can compare the models AIC and calculate the likelihood ratio test statistic. The AIC for
the SNP is 194.2, smaller than the 204.8 of the ordered probit. The AIC subtracts the number of estimated parameters from the
log likelihood, and thus may be biased toward models with more parameters. The likelihood ratio test statistic is reported as
part of Table A3 in the appendix and gives a p-value < 0.001, rejecting the null that the ordered probit ﬁts as well as the SNP. A
multinomial probit, not reported, has a likelihood ratio test that fails to reject the ordered probit. This suggests a better model
ﬁt with the assumption of a single index function.
Based on the AIC and likelihood ratio tests, the SNP with polynomial of 3 dominates the ordered probit. Fig. A1 plots the
estimated distributions for each level of K, as well as lines at the cutpoints from K = 3. The shape remains roughly the same,
potentially bimodal, across the different levels of K.25 In Table A3 in the appendix, inspired by Stewart (2004), I compare model
ﬁt across different polynomials for the SNP. The AIC is lowest for the case of K = 3. A likelihood ratio test comparing K = 4 to
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Results from an ordered logit, which are very similar to those from the ordered probit, are available upon request.
This is the order implied by an unobserved latent variable is increasing in compliance costs.
24
The Awarded after 2004 dummy also sometimes has large differences across the two models.
25
However, a dip test (Cox, 2009) fails to reject the null that the distribution is unimodal. A bimodal distribution was not analyzed in the simulation results of
Fischer and Lyon (2014). For a bimodal distribution, the NGO’s best-response function may be piecewise non-monotonic, which complicates matters. However,
Fischer and Lyon (2019) assume a bimodal (two-types) distribution in their model of multi-tier ecolabel competition and ﬁnd the basic conclusions of Fischer
and Lyon (2014) hold when they restrict the two-type analysis to single-tier ecolabels like those examined in the present paper.
23

Table 3
Ordered probit and semi-nonparametric estimator results.

Cost Type
Opportunity
Careful Harvest

Administrative
Development
Conservation

Annual rainfall
Highly Suitable for Gorilla
Distance to Port
Std Dev Slope (degree)
River Area (pct)
Size
After 2004
Population Density
Distance PA
Gabon (dummy)

Hypo

Ordered Probit

–
–
–
–

−4.195.
−1.011∗
−1.681∗∗ ∗
−0.653∗∗

+
–

+
+
–

NGO Cutpoint
Industry Cutpoint

0.172∗
0.0655
1.726∗∗ ∗
−0.488
−0.659∗∗
−0.375

0.146+
0.252
4.043∗∗ ∗
−0.562
−0.588∗∗ ∗
−1.089+

(0.497)
(0.362)
(0.429)
(0.266)
(0.0824)
(0.237)
(0.416)
(0.533)
(0.168)
(0.660)

−33.14∗∗
−32.08∗∗

(10.58)
(10.56)

−33.14
−31.28∗ ∗∗

Fixed
(0.379)

1.750∗
0.0115
−0.441∗∗

(0.745)
(0.171)
(0.144)

SNP Coeﬃcient 1
SNP Coeﬃcient 2
SNP Coeﬃcient 3
Observations
Log-likelihood
AIC

SNP

−3.769∗ ∗∗
−0.804∗
−2.412∗ ∗∗
−1.245∗ ∗∗

(1.675)
(0.407)
(0.508)
(0.244)
(0.0699)
(0.226)
(0.350)
(0.503)
(0.202)
(0.558)

161
−90.38
204.8

161
−83.13
194.2

< .1, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < .001.
Notes: SNP is Semi-nonparametric estimator, estimated using the sneop command in stata (Stewart, 2004). Standard errors in parentheses. Index Coeﬃcients reported; note that they are not directly comparable. Outcome variable for is 1 if NGO, 2 if industry certiﬁed, 3
else. PA refers to distance to protected area.

+p

K = 3 fails to reject that K = 3 ﬁts the data better. Further comparisons across higher order polynomials do not suggest improved
ﬁt among them. Because of the lower AIC and the failure to reject the model when compared to K = 4, I select K = 3 as the main
speciﬁcation for the remainder of the analysis.

6.2. Lower compliance costs predict stricter standard choice
If the NGO standard is stricter than the industry standard, an implication of Lemma 1 is that forests with the lowest compliance cost type choose the NGO standard, those between the NGO and industry cutoff type �CN < � ≤ �CI choose the industry

label, and those above the industry cutoff type � > �CI opt out of either label. This section tests whether this holds in the context of Central Africa by examining the index coeﬃcients. In addition to the coeﬃcients, Table 3 includes the cost type and
the hypothesized direction of the effect for each covariate. Compliance cost types include opportunity cost, careful harvesting
costs, administrative costs, development costs, and conservation costs. I discuss the evidence for forest sorting for each cost type
below.
For opportunity cost, I focus on two ecological proxies, rainfall and gorilla habitat, that predicted an abundance of large trees
in an ecological study of the Congo Basin (Lewis et al., 2013). Ecologists hypothesize that more water from rainfall increases
net primary productivity. Having a higher median annual rainfall, measured in logs, is a signiﬁcant predictor of participation
for both speciﬁcations. For both speciﬁcations, the relative effect size is large. Having any highly suitable gorilla habitat is also
a signiﬁcant predictor of participation at the 5% level. Gorillas and other large herbivores feed on younger trees, reducing competition for mature trees and thus increasing their abundance. Gorilla habitat suitability includes the potential extent of gorilla
range, including in the past, and thus includes areas currently without gorillas.26
Below gorilla habitat, there are three proxies for costs from careful harvesting practices. Forests that have varied terrain and
are far from the port inherently beneﬁt from careful harvesting practices because extraction and transport are more expensive.
These forests may already have inventory systems in place, lowering their compliance costs. Both distance from the port and the
variability of the terrain decrease compliance costs, increasing the likelihood of participation. Both coeﬃcients are statistically
signiﬁcant at the 0.1% level. Distance to the nearest port also proxies for shared changes in forest productivity along a gradient
that starts at the coast and moves inland. In addition to transport costs, port distance may reﬂect historical patterns of exploitation and other unobservables that vary along this gradient. In contrast, having waterways increases compliance costs because
the NGO standard requires roads to avoid rivers and streams, increasing the length and complexity of roadways. Forests with

26
The coeﬃcient on the gorilla habitat suitability may reﬂect a combination of factors. As discussed, current and former gorilla habitat should have a higher
density of trees with large diameter, decreasing opportunity cost. Habitat that currently has gorillas may also have higher conservation costs; this would make
the hypothesis for the direction of the coeﬃcient positive. Furthermore, if consumers infer average forest type conditional on certiﬁcation, and if consumers
value forest characteristics (either independently or jointly with changes in harvesting practices), than forests with a gorilla population may have greater
incentives to certify. This would also lead to a positive coeﬃcient. This latter effect is not in the Fischer and Lyon (2014) model, where consumers only value
changes in harvesting practices. The coeﬃcient thus reﬂects the net effect of these three incentives.

more rivers and streams are less likely to participate. The estimate is more precise for the ordered probit than the SNP estimator.
Administrative costs, including ﬁxed costs from audits, should be lower per unit timber for larger forests. However, I fail to
reject the null that forest size has no effect on forest type. Administrative costs likely decrease over the time a ﬁrm manages a
forest, as they prepare the necessary documentation for certiﬁcation. For forests awarded more recently, we ﬁnd a very precise,
large positive effect on their expected forest type.
The NGO eco-label requires ﬁrms to respond to local development needs. Population density proxies for how development
needs vary across space. Because these areas are so remote, accessing populations in order to provide services often requires
building costly roads. However, population density fails to predict participation in eco-label standards.27 Either development
indicators are poorly monitored by eco-label auditors, their costs are an unimportant component of the cost of compliance, or
my population measure is a poor proxy for development costs.28
Finally, I assess compliance costs related to biodiversity conservation. The NGO eco-label requires ﬁrms to set aside high
conservation value forest, precluding it from exploitation. To proxy for high conservation value forest, we use the distance to
the nearest protected area. Forests further from protected areas are associated with lower compliance costs and are more likely
to participate; the effect is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level for the ordered probit and the 0.1% level for the SNP estimator.

6.2.1. Assessing consumer awareness of forest management practices
In the theoretical model, consumers do not directly observe forest harvesting practices or forest type. In this section, I compare monthly harvesting data for one forest management unit in 2006 before and after a visit from the independent forest
monitor, Resource Extraction Monitoring (REM).29 During their visit on August 29, 2006, REM noted several violations of forest
harvesting practices. These violations were published in their Report No. 53. If timber consumers were unaware of forest harvesting practices and the report made them aware of these violations, we would expect a decrease in demand. To test whether
prices or volumes changed after the independent monitoring visit, I use an OLS regression with ﬁxed effects for each species and
standard errors clustered by species. I test whether prices or volumes were higher in the ﬁnal three months of the year using an
event study design, where the counter-factual is that harvesting could be similar to earlier in the year.
From Table A5, we fail to ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant difference in the price or volume felled after the independent monitor’s
visit. The coeﬃcient Post is about zero for price and positive for volume, though both estimates are very noisy. Fig. A3 plots each
species price per month and includes a red vertical line at the time of the monitor’s visit. We see that prices do not vary much
across time; the within-species standard deviation is about 2%. We fail to ﬁnd a clear trend downward after the monitor’s visit.
This investigation of prices and volumes for one forest fails to reject our hypothesis that consumers do not observe forest
harvesting practices, however it has several limitations and should be interpreted with caution. First, there are not strong incentives for ﬁrms to truthfully report the FOB log price. Given this, and the fact that we only have one forest, we may be able to
detect price changes. Second, absent panel data for this forest, we cannot separately identify seasonal changes in harvesting
from the post-visit period. Finally, while a null result could imply that consumers were unaware of REM’s report, it could also
imply that they were already aware of CFC’s harvesting practices and failed to change their valuation of CFC’s timber after seeing
the report.

6.3. Label competition decreases environmental beneﬁts
Whether label competition helps or hurts environmental beneﬁts, relative to an NGO in autarky, depends on the interaction
between the price premium shape and the distribution of forest types and how this affects the standard the NGO chooses relative
to autarky. If the NGO label becomes stricter with competition, there are two trade offs. First, there are inframarginal losses from
ﬁrms that would have chosen the NGO label in autarky but now switch to the industry label. Second, there are intensive margin
gains from a stricter NGO standard with competition and extensive margin gains from more ﬁrms participating due to industry’s
weaker standard. Fischer and Lyon (2014) found that wide distributions with a left-skew were more likely to see an increase in
environmental beneﬁts from label competition. This section compares the observed NGO standard with competition with the
inferred NGO standard in autarky and uses estimates from the semi-nonparametric estimator with K = 3 to ﬁnd the change in
environmental beneﬁts from label competition.
We begin by visually evaluating the estimated density of predicted forest types, shown in Fig. 2, to see whether it has a leftskew.30 The ﬁgure shows a histogram and kernel density of forest types. The two vertical lines indicate the NGO and industry
cutoff values from Table 3. The SNP density appears wider than the ordered probit and exhibits a right-, not left-, skew.

27
This result is robust to alternative measurements of forest population, including total population in the forest (in logs or levels) as well as maximum,
minimum, mean, and standard deviation of population within one square kilometer; all measures failed to predict participation.
28
Table A4 reports correlations across covariates. Population density is correlated with several measures, which may explain why it fails to predict participation.
29
Monthly harvesting data come from the Annual Report for 2006 submitted by the forest management unit, 10-003, managed by CFC, to the Ministry of
Forestry. Unfortunately, this was the only report that satisﬁed two requirements: it included monthly harvesting data and it covered a period during which the
independent monitor visited. In the annual report, the ﬁrm does not report prices; instead, they report felling taxes and volume felled. Felling taxes are equal to
2.5% of a species FOB price (Topa et al., 2009:178) and were used to back out the implied price.
30
The density and distribution for the ordered probit are also plotted to make clear how a distributional assumption would affect the analysis.

Fig. 2. Predicted Density of Unobserved Forest Type
Notes: Histogram of predicted values from estimation results in Table 3. Lines at estimated NGO and Industry cutpoints.

To ﬁnd the NGO and industry standard levels with competition, as well as the NGO standard level in autarky, we use several
model estimates to ﬁnd the price premium curvature parameter J in expression 1. Speciﬁcally, we need estimates for �CI , �CN ,
F (�CI ), F (�CN ), f (�CN ), and ∫

�CI

�CN

F (� )d� . From the estimated cutoff values, I ﬁnd the implied cumulative distribution, pictured in

Fig. 3. I then rescale the cutoff values by the minimum predicted forest type value, � = −36.56, to get estimates for the cutoff

̂N = 3.46.
types �̂CI = 5.26 and �
C

̂N ) = 7%, relative to the observed value of 10.5%. The
The estimated cumulative distribution at the NGO cutoff is small, F (�
C

implied industry cumulative distribution is large, F (�̂CI ) = 38%, relative to the observed value of 29%. To estimate ∫

�CI

�CN

F (� )d� ,

I calculate the area under the cdf and get about 0.40. Together, these values result in � = 4.21 and � = 2.46. Solving for J
using the NGO cutoff type in expression (14), we get J = 8.5.31 I explore the price premium in the following section. For now,
= 0.28 for the standards
with the price premium value in hand, we can calculate that the implied values are sIC = 0.12 and sN
C
I

N

with competition. Given the cdf and standard levels, environmental beneﬁts with competition are equal to B(sCN , sCI ) = 0.057.
To ﬁnd the NGO standard and environmental beneﬁts in autarky, I use the price premium and the distribution of forest types
that maximizes B(sN
, 0). This corresponds to sNA = {0.18, 0.20}, which is less stringent than the NGO standard
to ﬁnd the sN
A
A

with competition, sCN = 0.28. Both values for the NGO standard in autarky give environmental beneﬁts B(sAN , 0) = 0.067. Beneﬁts
appear higher in the NGO autarky case.
Although competition induces more forests to participate, through the weaker industry standard, sIC < sAN , and increases the

> sNA , neither of these changes is large enough to offset the inframarginal loss from forests
stringency of the NGO’s standard, sN
C
with types � ∈ (�CN , �AN ) that now choose the weaker standard. In the case of Central Africa’s forests, eco-label competition
slightly decreases environmental beneﬁts.
6.4. Implications for price premia
In the previous section, we found the shape parameter J = 8.5 for the price premium function, p(s) = ln(1 + Js) + A. In
this section, I explore the implied price premia for the NGO and industry, relative to each other and uncertiﬁed wood, as well
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There are two possible values, J = 8.5 and J = 3.5. Only J = 8.5 gives a non-negative value for both standards.

Fig. 3. Predicted cumulative distribution of unobserved forest type.

Fig. 4. Price premium shape for different shifters.

as the counter-factual price premium for NGO certiﬁed wood in autarky. To compare prices across categories, I calculate price
ratios. Fig. 4 plots price ratios for different values of A, which is unidentiﬁed.
We can use observed price ratios for NGO certiﬁed wood relative to uncertiﬁed wood to get a sense of the possible values
for A. Conditional on exporting, prices were 5–51% higher for FSC certiﬁed wood as compared to uncertiﬁed wood in Bolivia
(Nebel et al., 2005) and about 27–50% higher in Malaysia (Kollert and Lagan, 2007). If we consider the values of A where the

NGO certiﬁed wood has a price 25–50% higher than the uncertiﬁed wood, this corresponds to A ∈ [2.5, 5]. Focusing on this
range of A, we see that the implied price ratio for industry certiﬁed wood is 14–28% relative to uncertiﬁed wood. The price ratio
for NGO to industry certiﬁed wood is about 9–17%, which seems a reasonable markup between the two label types.
We have assumed a price premium functional form that is fairly ﬂexible. Fig. A2 shows how the shape of the price premium
changes with different values for J and for different intercepts. The estimated price premium curve is plotted against a curve
with J = 1, the functional form used as a “regular” price premium in Fischer and Lyon’s (2014) simulations. A price premium of
J = 8.5 ﬁts more closely to their bowed price premium.
7. Conclusion
This is the ﬁrst paper to estimate the environmental beneﬁts of eco-label competition. For forestry eco-labels in the Congo
Basin, I empirically estimated forest compliance cost type using ordinal data and a semi-nonparametric estimator. The distribution of forest costs was wide but skewed toward high costs, making the industry standard less valuable in sorting forests into
eco-labels. I found that label competition likely decreases environmental beneﬁts as compared to an NGO standard in autarky.
The price premium shape parameter suggests marginal willingness-to-pay for forest protection is decreasing in protection.
Industry certiﬁed wood prices are expected to be about 14–28% higher than uncertiﬁed wood. NGO certiﬁed wood prices are
predicted to be 9–17% higher than industry certiﬁed wood.
Next, I tested the theoretical model’s prediction that forests with lower compliance costs will choose stricter standards.
Consistent with the model, I show direct evidence of selection on lower costs of compliance into certiﬁcation. This coheres
with indirect evidence from voluntary policies in industrialized contexts. There, ﬁrm and facility size predict participation.32 If
managing larger ﬁrms and facilities requires administrative savvy, and if voluntary policies require documentation and internal
management, large ﬁrm size could reﬂect lower compliance costs. Alternatively, it could reﬂect larger ﬁrms spreading out ﬁxed
costs. In a similar vein, ﬁrms with high emissions participate more frequently in voluntary pollution abatement programs.33 If
emissions are high from older pollution abatement technology, cheap pollution abatement technologies may be available and
ﬁrms may be considering these investments anyway. This would ﬁt with selection on lower compliance costs. On the other
hand, high emissions could reﬂect high marginal abatement costs.
Other indirect evidence comes from inspections by regulators in industrialized contexts. Shareholders use proxy votes to
pressure ﬁrms to participate when ﬁrms are large, have frequent inspections, and have high emissions (Gupta and Innes, 2014).
Regulator inspections consistently predict participation in voluntary policies.34 Regulators tend to target inspections to ﬁrms
with low marginal abatement costs (Hanna et al., 2010; Duﬂo et al., 2018) and participation in voluntary policies offers ﬁrms
relief from regulator inspections and ﬁnes (Foster and Gutierrez, 2016). A source of environmental beneﬁts not accounted for
in this paper is that, by extending participation, label competition may allow honest regulators to better target enforcement
actions on non-participants.35
If consumers are incompletely informed or monitors are corrupt, label standards may be uncertain. In this case, entry by
industry risks inducing a “nonlabeling equilibrium [where] a ﬁrm does not certify product quality even if it can, so lack of a label
represents no news … Labeling in the nonlabeling equilibrium is an unexpected, out-of-equilibrium action” (Harbaugh et al.,
2011). In this study, we fail to ﬁnd evidence of a nonlabeling equilibrium because forests sort into labels based on compliance
costs. Because of forest sorting, additional confusion from industry entry likely attenuates, not eliminates, environmental beneﬁts in the forestry sector. Future work should consider how much consumer confusion and imperfect monitoring attenuate
beneﬁts.
Label participation is easy to observe in many contexts. A careful look at eco-label standards can offer proxies for forest
compliance costs which can be used to get a sense of the underlying distribution of forest costs. By relying on forests sorting
into labels, policymakers can use observed participation and the shape of compliance costs to better understand whether label
competition will help or hurt environmental beneﬁts. Even if we observe reduced extraction by forests participating in the
weaker label (Cerutti et al., 2011; Heilmayr and Lambin, 2016), this does not render label competition innocuous. In our case,
environmental beneﬁts would be 17% higher if policymakers restricted entry by weaker labels. Given that the difference in
environmental beneﬁts with and without label competition is small and measured with uncertainty, more work is needed to
document patterns across sectors, space, and local institutional strength to better understand when label competition tends
to decreases beneﬁts and entry by industry labels should be restricted. This paper offers a tractable method for estimating the
distribution of forest compliance costs that can be used in other forestry and ﬁsheries contexts.
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For example, see Henriques et al. (2013), King et al. (2005), Nakamura et al. (2001), Dasgupta et al. (2000), and DeCanio and Watkins (1998).
For example, see Dasgupta et al. (2000), Gamper-Rabindran (2006), Vidovic and Khanna (2007), and (Gupta and Innes, 2014).
34
For example, see Foster and Gutierrez (2016), Gupta and Innes (2014), Blackman et al. (2010), Blackman and Guerrero (2012), Foster and Gutierrez (2013),
Gupta and Innes (2014), Bi and Khanna (2012), Sam et al. (2009), Innes et al. (2008), and Gamper-Rabindran (2006).
35
If auditors are not corrupt. Air pollution auditors in India reported emissions just below the sanction threshold before truth-telling was incentivized (Duﬂo
et al., 2018).
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Appendix Tables
Table A1
Criteria and Cost Proxies from Forest Stewardship Council Eco-Label Standard (FSC-STD-01-001 (version 4-0) EN)
FSC Criterion

Cost Proxy

2.2 - Local communities with legal or customary tenure or use rights shall maintain control,
to the extent necessary to protect their rights or resources …
3.2 - Forest management shall not threaten or diminish, either directly or indirectly, the
resources or tenure rights of indigenous peoples
4.1 - The communities within, or adjacent to, the forest management area should be given
opportunities for employment, training, and other services
5.3 - Forest management should minimize waste associated with harvesting and on-site
processing operations and avoid damage to other forest resources
5.5 - Forest management operations shall recognize, maintain, and, where appropriate,
enhance the value of forest services and resources such as watersheds and ﬁsheries
FSC Criterion
5.6 - The rate of harvest of forest products shall not exceed levels which can be permanently
sustained
6.2 - Safeguards shall exist which protect rare, threatened and endangered species and their
habitats … Conservation zones and protection areas shall be established … Inappropriate
hunting, ﬁshing, trapping and collecting shall be controlled
6.3 - Ecological functions and values shall be maintained intact, enhanced, or restored,
including: forest regeneration and succession
6.5 - Written guidelines shall be prepared and implemented to: control erosion; minimize
forest damage during harvesting, road construction, and all other mechanical disturbances;
and protect water resources
8.3 - Documentation shall be provided by the forest manager to enable monitoring and
certifying organizations to trace each forest product from its origin, a process known as the
“chain of custody.”
9.3 - The management plan shall include and implement speciﬁc measures that ensure the
maintenance and/or enhancement of the applicable conservation attributes consistent with
the precautionary approach …

Population measures
No measure available
Population measures
Variation in slope
Percent of forest management unit area
covered by rivers, streams, and lake
Cost Proxy
Rainfall, gorilla habitat, forest size
Distance to protected area, gorilla habitat,
population measures
Rainfall, gorilla habitat, forest size
Distance from port, variation in slope,
multiple forest dummy, forest size
Multiple forest dummy, forest size

Distance to protected area, gorilla habitat

Table A2
Data Sources
Data Type

Source

Scale

Rivers and Lakes
Population

Digital Chart of the World
from the Center for International Earth Science Information Network
(CIESIN) of the Earth Institute at Columbia University’s Gridded
Population of the World, version 3 (GPWv3)
World Resource Institute’s Cameroon Forest Atlast Version 2
WorldClim database, Version 4 (release 3). See Hijmans et al. (2005) for
details
NASA Shuttle Radar Topographic Mission’s (SRTM) Digital Elevation
Model, Version 4
Intitute of Applied Ecology’s (IIEA) African Mammals Databank
EGY Shipping’s World Port Codes
World Resources Institute’s Cameroon Forest Atlas, Version 2 and Gabon
Forest Atlas, Version 1

90m resolution
1:1,000,000 map

Country boundaries
Precipitation
Slope
Gorilla Area of Occupancy
Ports
Forest and Protected Area
Boundaries

90 m resolution
90 m resolution
90m resolution

Table A3
Comparing Across Semi-nonparametric Models
K

log-likelihood

AIC

df

LR test of K-1

p-value

OP
3
4
5
6

−90.38
−83.13
−83.12
−82.92
−82.89

204.8
194.2
196.2
197.8
199.8

1
2
3
4

14.49
0.0284
0.390
.061

0.0007
0.986
0.942
0.999

Notes: df is degrees of freedom, 1 degree of freedom for LR test of K − 1 in each row.

Table A4
Pairwise correlation among covariates
Size
Size
Rain
Gorilla
Port
Slope
River
Pop Density
PA
After 2004

1
0.0483
0.3242∗
0.0293
0.3019∗
−0.110
−0.3548∗
0.0357
0.0544

Rain

Gorilla

Port

1
0.3080∗
−0.113
−0.0734
−0.5184∗
−0.2970∗
0.142

−0.4101∗
−0.0710
−0.4886∗

Slope

River

Density

1
0.0846
0.2797∗
−0.0513
0.0855

1
0.105
−0.115
0.0425

−0.0270
−0.0610

PA

2004

1

−0.144
−0.8120∗
0.5032∗
0.149
0.4765∗
−0.1784∗
0.2737∗

1

0.0956
−0.2468∗

1
1

−0.0830

1

Notes: ∗ marks p < 0.05. PA refers to distance to protected area.

Table A5
Response to independent forest monitor report

Post
Constant
Observations
R2

(1)
Price

(2)
Volume

−0.00187
(0.00579)
7.772∗∗
(0.00193)

0.128
(0.145)
2.990∗∗
(0.0484)

160
0.992

160
0.889

p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Notes: Data from the annual report submitted to the
Cameroonian Ministry of Forestry for one forest management
unit, CFC, in 2006. Standard errors clustered by species in
parentheses; 29 species total. Unit of observation is a speciesmonth. Regression includes ﬁxed effects by species. Unbalanced panel.

+

Fig. A1 Varying polynomial for semi-nonparametric estimation Notes: Lines at cutpoints for the K = 3 polynomial. Cutpoints for other polynomials will differ.
The speciﬁcation used to estimate each density is identical to that of the SNP in Table 3 except for the value for K.

Fig. A2 Price Premium Shape at Standard Levels 2

Fig. A3 Monthly price per species per meter cubed for CFC forest in 2006. Notes: The independent forest monitor, Resource visited CFC’s forest concession
10-003 on Aug 29, 2006 and documented three infractions in their report (No. 53). The red line indicates the month of September. 3

Data Appendix Table A2 describes the geospatial data, source, and scale used in the empirical analysis. All geospatial data were
processed using ArcGIS version 9.3’s scripting module, arcgisscripting, and Python version 2.5. For the digital elevation model
data, the panels were downloaded from the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research’s website (CGIAR) and
knitted together before processing. The following describes how data were prepared for the econometric analysis:

∙
∙
∙
∙

Data were transformed into WGS-84 datum and projected using the Mercator projection
Boundaries clipped to country boundaries
Vector data rasterized to cell size of 1 km and raster data was resampled to cell size 1 km
FMU and Protected Area boundaries were used as inputs for the zonal statistics tool from the Spatial Analyst toolbox to
calculate mean, min, max, range, and variety of pixel values for each zone

Additional processing was necessary for some datasets. To calculate the slope of each 1 km cell across the three countries, I
used the slope tool in ArcGIS’s Spatial Analyst toolbox’s Surface kit to process elevation data derived from 90m NASA’s SRTM.
For each 1 km square, the slope tool measures in degrees, � , where tan(� ) = rise/run, by taking the maximum rise/run from the
eight neighboring cells.36 Note that the slope does not include information on aspect (the direction the slope is pointing).
Population data comes from two sources, both produced by the Center for International Earth Science Information Network
(CIESIN) of the Earth Institute at Columbia University. CIESIN produces the Gridded Population of the World, version 3 (GPWv3),
and the georeferenced Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project (GRUMP) dataset of point settlements and their estimated population. I used the gridded population for the population density measure for each FMU. I used CIESEN the settlement dataset’s
population estimate for the year 2000 to identify the location of seaports by matching names to a public listing of seaports from
the shipping company EGY Shipping.
To calculate the distance of an FMU to the seaport, I would have preferred to calculate the distance by road. However, I lack
a complete road network and thus was forced to use Euclidean distance. Euclidean distance is measured by creating a right
triangle on an x-y plane, where the centroid of the source and origin cells act as the acute angle vertices. The distance of the
hypotenuse of this triangle is recorded as the Euclidean distance between the two points.37 I used the same process to ﬁnd FMU
distance to the nearest protected area.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2020.102344.
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